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1. Introduction 
Consider the sorites paradox, and other philosophical paradoxes such as the liar 
paradox. The standard way of approaching them is by appeal to the semantic values – 
by which I mean something at the level of reference, broadly construed – of the key 
expressions employed in stating the paradoxes. A central plank in such an approach is 
often a logic of vagueness or a formal theory of truth. The friend of the approach then 
tries to explain the phenomena at hand by appeal to these semantic values. Call an 
approach like this a reference-based approach to a paradox. The simplest kind of 
reference-based approach seeks to resolve the paradox by appeal to the nature of those 
things that the key expressions represent. For example, one might seek to resolve the 
sorites paradox, which has its source in vagueness, by saying that vague predicates 
stand for vague properties, and then give a theory of the nature of these vague 
properties. Call such an approach metaphysical. Not all reference-based approaches to 
paradoxes need be metaphysical. One prominent approach to vagueness and the sorites 
paradox is supervaluationism.1 The supervaluationist does not hold that the semantic 
values of vague expressions are in and of themselves vague. Instead she says that vague 
expressions are semantically indeterminate, and these expressions refer to different 
things under different possible precisifications. Supervaluationism does not seek to 
explain the sorites paradox by appeal to the nature of the individual referents of vague 
expressions, so it is not a metaphysical approach. But supervaluationism is still a 
reference-based approach, seeking to explain vagueness by appeal to facts about the 
reference of vague expressions; specifically, by appeal to the fact that these expressions 
have a multitude of candidate referents. 
Of course, there are alternatives to reference-based approaches to paradoxes. 
One could at least in principle simply deny that vague language, or truth talk, is factual, 
and attempt to use this as the basis for a response.2 Perhaps the friend of this approach 
could say that our failure to resolve the sorites paradox is somehow due to a mistaken 
assumption to the effect that the vague language is factual. Or one could say that in 
addition to their semantic values, the relevant expressions have associated with them 
rules of use, not relating in any immediate way to contribution to truth-conditions, and 
                                                           
1 The classic reference is Fine (1975). See also Keefe (2000). 
2 See MacFarlane (2016) for a recent approach of this kind. 
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the paradox in question is explained by appeal to features of these rules of use.  
The incoherentist view on the sorites paradox which I favor is another 
alternative to reference-based approaches. This view says, roughly, that the paradoxes 
arise because of an inconsistency in meaning-constitutive rules. These rules do not 
operate alongside and independently of truth-conditions but also help determine the 
truth-conditions of sentences containing vague expressions. Since the rules are 
inconsistent, the truth-conditions cannot be such as to actually validate the rules. This, 
the thought is, explains why it is so hard to come up with a satisfactory account of the 
truth-conditions of vague sentences. This incoherentist view does not break as radically 
with the tradition of explaining paradox by appeal to truth-conditions as the two 
suggestions previously mentioned do, for the rules she appeals to are held to be relevant 
to the determination of truth conditions. However, comparing these other alternatives 
is still helpful when it comes to illustrating the sort of strategy the incoherentist 
employs. 
In what follows I will explain the incoherentist view I favor, present what I see as 
main arguments for such a view, discuss some purported objections, and compare other 
incoherentist views in the literature.3 While some of what I say explains and 
summarizing what is in the existing literature, primarily the discussion of objections 
contains much that is novel. 
 
2. Incoherentism 
When briefly characterizing incoherentism just above, I spoke of meaning-constitutive 
rules. Perhaps I should have used scare quotes around ‘rule’ to distance myself from 
this way of speaking. Lots of things can be, and have been, meant by talk of semantic 
rules, and I would want to distance myself from most of them. Even so, my own appeal 
to ‘rules’ will still be controversial. 
What I am supposing – later I will return to this supposition, but for now just 
bear with me – is that to employ an expression with a given meaning is to take on 
certain commitments, or to have certain kinds of dispositions to use the expression in 
a given way. Some of these commitments or dispositions may fail to be consistent with 
each other. My favored version of the view focuses on dispositions instead of 
commitments, and in what follows I will focus on my favored version of the view. 
                                                           
3 I have defended incoherentism about vagueness in, e.g., my (2002) and (2005). Other 
incoherentists include Dummett (1975) and Horgan (1994). Nihilism, the view according to 
which vague predicates fail to be true of anything, defended by e.g. Peter Unger (1979a, 1979b, 
1979c, 1980), Wheeler (e.g. 1975, 1979), Heller (1990), Ludwig and Ray (2002), and Braun and 
Sider (2007) is often mentioned alongside incoherentist views. (Williamson (1994), ch. 6, 
mentions Dummett as a nihilist.) But nihilism is importantly different from incoherentism. 
Saying that an expression is governed by inconsistent rules is one thing; saying that it is empty is 
another. The former may be held to entail the latter (though that is not my view – see below); it 
is not in the least plausible that the latter entails the former. I will return to nihilism (as 
defended by Unger) below. 
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We may then say that a given language is inconsistent exactly if competence 
with all elements of that language involves dispositions to accept things that are 
inconsistent with each other. Talk of language being inconsistent hardly has a 
pretheoretically clear meaning. I am using the locution partly stipulatively.  
The account of competence just sketched does not by itself say anything about 
the semantic values of the expressions of an inconsistent language. One perhaps 
natural suggestion would be that when the rules governing an expression are 
inconsistent, then the expression simply lacks a semantic value (or it has a trivial 
semantic value: for example, a predicate would be empty). I see two problems with 
this. First, this seems implausibly radical: it yields that nothing is old, or red, or a 
mountain, etc. Anyone who embraces this radical idea is apt to want to draw a 
distinction between assertible and non-assertible sentences of, for example, the form 
‘___ is old’, and so mitigate the problem by saying that those of these sentences we 
would take to be true are at least assertible. However, deciding under what conditions 
sentences are assertible presents much the same problems as deciding under what 
conditions they are true, and supposing one can come up with a satisfactory theory of 
assertibility, why not simply use that also as a theory of truth? Second, a different 
problem is that the incoherence is holistic. It is not just the rules for one expression 
that lead to incoherence. The rules governing vague expressions lead to problems only 
jointly with assumptions about logic.4 If the incoherence is holistic, exactly which 
expressions should then be taken to be empty? 
Instead I prefer a view that allows vague expressions to have non-trivial semantic 
values despite the fact that vagueness is inconsistent in the way indicated. Here is one 
way of allowing for this. Consider the theory of reference-determination in the spirit of 
Lewis.5 Following Carnap, Lewis held theoretical terms to be somehow implicitly 
defined by the theories in which they occur. In the simplest case, the referent of a 
theoretical term is whatever makes true the sentences of the theory wherein the term 
occurs. But we certainly want to say that theoretical terms occurring in false theories 
can refer, so we can’t always say exactly that. What Lewis does is to allow that the term 
refers to what comes closest, and close enough, to making true those sentences of the 
theory. Closeness is here not just a matter of what, quantitatively, makes true the most 
sentences. Overall best fit is what is at issue; qualitative considerations enter in as well. 
And if it turned out that a given theory was inconsistent, the same would apply. 
Inconsistency is not relevantly different from mere falsity. It is presumably obvious 
where I am going with this: the relationship between the semantic values of vague 
expressions and the rules, in the sense gestured at, which govern them is, I suggest, like 
that between the semantic value of a theoretical term introduced by an inconsistent 
                                                           
4 See e.g. Zardini (2008). 
5 See e.g. Lewis (1970), (1972), and (1997). 
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theory and the sentences of that theory. 
It is reasonable to speculate that it is indeterminate just what the semantic 
values of vague expressions are:  it is indeterminate what assignment comes closest to 
making true the principles that function as meaning-constitutive rules. But vague 
expressions have non-trivial semantic values; it is only that it is indeterminate what 
these non-trivial semantic values are. 
 These general remarks are consistent with many different specific views 
regarding what the semantic values of the relevant expressions are. The main point for 
present purposes is that a language being inconsistent need not be bound up with the 
relevant expressions having trivial semantic values, or lack semantic values altogether. 
It is possible, of course, to think that what has just been sketched is only one factor in 
reference-determination, and other considerations enter in as well. One might even 
hold that the principles it is part of competence to be disposed to accept do not 
contribute in any direct way to reference determination: instead some kind of causal 
theory of reference is correct.  
If languages can be inconsistent in the way characterized, one can attempt to 
diagnose some philosophical paradoxes as arising from inconsistency of our language. 
The form of the diagnosis is that among the assumptions that lead to absurdity 
through the paradoxical reasoning are some that are untrue but underwritten by 
competence. 
In the case of vagueness, the present topic, a natural way to spell out the 
incoherentist idea would be to say that tolerance principles are meaning-constitutive 
for vague predicates, where a tolerance principle for a predicate F is: 
 
Tolerance: Some small enough difference in F’s parameter of application never 
matters to F’s applicability, even while some large enough difference sometimes 
does. 
 
It is tolerance principles that underwrite the sorites paradox. Take a specific version of 
the paradox: 
 
(1) Someone who is 1400 mm tall is not tall. 
(2) For all n, if someone who is n mm tall is not tall, then someone who is n+1 mm 
tall is not tall. 
(C) So, someone who is 2900 mm tall is not tall. 
 
The ‘some small enough difference never matters’ part underwrites the major premise, 
(2); the ‘some large enough difference sometimes matters’ underwrites both that there 
will be an intuitively acceptable premise like (1) and an intuitively unacceptable 
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conclusion like (C). 
My view is that not only is vagueness a source of inconsistency in language of 
the kind outlined, but also that this is crucial to understanding vagueness and the 
sorites paradox. I will defend this claim in the next section. One could in principle 
agree that vagueness is a source of inconsistency in the way described, but hold that 
this is not very interesting – that the key to obtaining a theoretical understanding of 
vagueness and the sorites lie elsewhere. Consider in this connection what I said above 
about semantic value. The dispositions constitutive of competence are dispositions to 
accept incoherent things, but help determine consistent, non-trivial truth-conditions. 
This means that the incoherentist view I defend is in principle compatible with any 
standard view on the truth-conditions of vague sentences found in the literature, and 
does not immediately provide support for one of these views over others. Philosophers 
of a certain bent of mind will then ask: what is the point? Doesn’t the incoherentist 
suggestion leave everything as it is? This is a possible and understandable reaction, but 
it betrays commitment to a reference-based approach to the paradox. For what it 
amounts to is that suggestions that do not have any immediate implications regarding 
reference do not have any important implications as far as the paradox is concerned. 
 
3. Arguments for incoherentism 
If the incoherentist view is correct, that nicely explains a number of phenomena 
related to vagueness and the sorites. In this section I will go through these things. 
Recalcitrance. The hypothesis explains the seeming irresolubility of the sorites 
paradox: why every proposed solution seems intuitively unsatisfactory. A natural way to 
see the literature is this. Proposed semantics for vagueness leave the extensions of vague 
predicates with unintuitively sharp boundaries; new semantics are proposed, meant to get 
around this; those semantics are argued not to avoid the problem; and so on. A seeming 
problem with a fully classical and bivalent theory is that an arbitrarily small difference in the 
relevant dimension given this theory implausibly makes for a difference between it being 
true that something is F and false that something is F, for F a vague predicate. If in response 
to this problem a many-valued or fuzzy theory is proposed, a version of the original problem 
remains. There are still unwanted boundaries, this time between, e.g., the true and the 
neither-true-nor-false, or the perfectly true and the less than perfectly true. A seeming 
lesson of the philosophical discussion of the sorites paradox is that this generalizes. Any 
otherwise acceptable assignment of semantic values to expressions of our language yields 
unwanted boundaries. Incoherentism does not get around this. Nor is it meant to. What it 
does yield is that no assignment of truth-conditions to vague sentences will fully satisfy the 
meanings of vague expressions. It then predicts the phenomenon of recalcitrance. The 
incoherentist can say that one cannot expect there to be an otherwise acceptable assignment 
of truth-conditions to vague sentences that avoids these unintuitively sharp boundaries. All 
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one can hope for is that some assignments come close enough to respecting the meaning of 
vague expressions that these expressions have semantic values. Needless to say, friends of 
specific accounts of vagueness found in the literature will think they have their own ways of 
getting around the problem, and to properly make an argument from recalcitrance one 
would need to discuss individual proposals separately. 
Flip-flopping. The issue of recalcitrance has to do with what happens when we try to 
theorize about vagueness. Focus now not on theorizing about vagueness but on the actual 
use of vague expressions. Arguably, one distinctive feature of what happens in sorites cases 
is that speakers are apt to flip flop. An item that is classified one way at first can be classified 
a different way later and the speaker never comes to a stable verdict. This phenomenon 
underlies the appeal of contextualist account of vagueness.6 But it is also neatly explained by 
appeal to the idea that vague expressions are governed by inconsistent ‘rules’. Compare: You 
work in a paint shop. You’re being told that paradigmatic red paint goes in the left corner 
and paradigmatic yellow paint goes in the right corner. For any two jars of paint, if the paint 
in the jars is sufficiently alike they should go in the same corner. If the paint shop is 
sufficiently well stocked, the jars of paint constitute a sorites series, and there is no way you 
can obey these instructions.  Assuming you don’t notice the inconsistency in the 
instructions, you will vacillate, in a way familiar from the vagueness literature. Having 
classified a jar of paint one way and put it in the right corner you can notice its similarity to 
jars of paint put in the other corner and so revise your verdict on that, but having done so, 
you will think other jars of paint put in the right corner should be reclassified. But then… Of 
course, you will soon realize the futility of your undertaking; but the same applies in the case 
of vague expressions. Any classification is bound to fail to respect a meaning-constitutive 
principle governing the expression. That does not mean that vague predicates are empty – 
any more than the paint store employee succeeds in her task by not dividing up the jars at 
all. 
The nature of vagueness.7 What is it for an expression, for example a predicate, to 
be vague? Here is one kind of suggestion found in the literature: 
 
(BORDERLINE) For a predicate to be vague is for it to have possible borderline 
cases. 
 
But what is a borderline case? Do we have an independent handle on what borderline 
cases, in the relevant sense, are? To elaborate: If a predicate F has borderline cases if 
and only if some sentences of the form ‘___ is F’ are neither true nor false, then there 
are phenomena other than vagueness which give rise to borderline cases. For 
(BORDERLINE) to provide an acceptable account of the nature of vagueness 
                                                           
6 See e.g. Fara (2000), Kamp (1981), Raffman (2014), Shapiro (2006), and Soames (1999). 
7 This theme is developed in Eklund (2005). 
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‘borderline case’ must mean something more specific. But here the worry arises that to 
elucidate to intended sense of ‘borderline case’ one must speak of lack of truth-value 
due to vagueness, and then we no longer have a very informative characterization of 
vagueness. 
 A different suggestion is: 
 
(SORITES-SUSCEPTIBILITY) For a predicate to be vague is for it to be sorites-
susceptible. 
 
But what is it for a predicate to be sorites-susceptible? For it to be such as to make 
some sorites reasoning sound? No, for the sorites reasoning is not sound. Is it then 
for it to make some sorites reasoning seductive – that it be such that we are actually 
disposed to be taken in by the reasoning? But that proposal yields that vagueness is 
just a psychological phenomenon. Suppose we stopped having the disposition to be 
taken in by sorites reasoning using ‘old’ – perhaps because of there being greater 
awareness of the problems with such reasoning. The proposal at issue does not 
immediately have the consequence that ‘old’ would change its meaning; but it does have 
the consequence that ‘old’ would cease to be vague. I think a reasonable proposal 
regarding vagueness makes vagueness a matter of meaning, in such a way that a vague 
expression cannot cease to be vague without change in meaning.  
  However, appeal to (SORITES-SUSCEPTIBILITY) does work if sorites-
susceptibility is written into the meanings of vague predicates in the way outlined in 
the characterization of the incoherentist view. Then the vagueness of an expression is 
not just a matter of whether we happen to be taken in by some associated sorites 
reasoning. It is a matter of something that is constitutive of the meaning of the 
predicate. 
Vagueness and semantic indeterminacy. It is generally agreed that vagueness 
in some way gives rise to or is associated with semantic indeterminacy.  Note the 
gives rise to or is associated with, rather than is identical with. It should be 
uncontroversial that there are sources of semantic indeterminacy other than 
vagueness, for example partial definition, and the indeterminacy phenomenon 
Hartry Field (1973) discusses in connection with Newtonian ‘mass’.8 But even if 
vagueness is not identical to semantic indeterminacy one can wish for an account of 
how vagueness is connected to semantic indeterminacy. 
Standard models for what the semantic indeterminacy associated with 
                                                           
8 What Field discusses is that given what we know today, there is no quantity which exactly 
satisfies the conception associated with mass in Newtonian physics. Instead there are two 
quantities – relativistic mass and rest mass – that both are best candidates. Field thinks ‘mass’ 
as used by Newtonians is semantically indeterminate as between relativistic mass and rest mass.  
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vagueness would be like are unsatisfactory, connected to how theories of the sorites 
paradox generally are unsatisfactory. Saying that a vague predicate carves up the 
domain into three classes, those entities it is true of, those it is false of, and those 
such that it is indeterminate whether it applies, is unsatisfactory as it gives rise to 
unintuitive sharp boundaries. 
Some theorists, those who appeal to metaphysical vagueness and those inclined 
to favor epistemicist accounts, may of course deny any connection between vagueness 
and semantic indeterminacy, and they can appeal to the problems in making good sense 
of the indeterminacy in question as part of their case for the denial.9 However, I believe 
that the incoherentist view can serve as a basis for a nice account of the relation 
between vagueness and semantic indeterminacy.10 
Distinguish between first-level indeterminacy and second-level 
indeterminacy: 
 
A sentence is first-level indeterminate if it (due to indeterminacy) lacks classical 
truth value under some acceptable assignment of semantic values. 
A sentence is second-level indeterminate if (due to indeterminacy) it has 
different truth values under different acceptable assignments of semantic 
values.11 
 
An acceptable assignment of semantic values is here a best possible account of 
semantic values. An acceptable assignment in this sense is not the same thing as a 
precisification, as ‘precisification’ is used in the discussion of supervaluationism about 
vagueness.12 The way traditional supervaluationists think about it, vagueness gives rise 
to an expression’s having a multitude of precisifications, corresponding to the ways of 
making the expression precise, compatibly with the meaning it is currently endowed 
with. Each precisification is classical. Moreover, a sentence is true iff it is true under 
all precisifications, false iff false under all precisifications, and neither true nor false iff 
it has different truth-values under different precisifications. Supervaluationism is only 
a framework for modeling first-level indeterminacy. The correct assignment of a 
semantic value to a sentence that receives different truth-values under different 
precisifications is neither true nor false. 
                                                           
9 However, arguably the unwanted boundaries problem arises also for the metaphysical 
indeterminacy theorist. 
10 See especially Eklund (2010b). 
11 The reason for the added “due to indeterminacy” in the first definition is that there may be 
other reasons for lack of classical truth value besides indeterminacy, for example presupposition 
failure. I know of no corresponding need for a similar clause in the second definition, but it does 
not hurt to include it. Because of the occurrences of this clause, the characterization of first- and 
second-level indeterminacy is not a reductive characterization of what indeterminacy amounts 
to. 
12 See again Fine (1975). 
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Note that there can be second-level indeterminacy without such first-level 
indeterminacy: it can be that some sentences have different truth-values under 
different acceptable assignments but under no assignment does a sentence lack a 
determinate classical truth value.  
 The concern about standard accounts of the semantic indeterminacy associated 
with vagueness is that saying that vague expressions carve up their domains into more 
than two classes fails to get around the problem of unwanted boundaries. This is a 
strike against postulating that vagueness is bound up with first-level indeterminacy. 
(An assignment of semantic values to vague expressions given which there is first-level 
indeterminacy does not do appreciably better in accommodating the intuitive picture 
associated with vagueness that does an assignment of semantic values to vague 
expressions given which there is no such indeterminacy.) But it is reasonable to 
speculate that given an incoherentist view on vagueness, vagueness is regularly 
associated with second-level indeterminacy: if there is no way to satisfy the constraints 
imposed on truth-conditions by what is constitutive of meaning, why suppose there 
will still in general be a unique best assignment of truth conditions?13 One can then 
accommodate the sense that vagueness is somehow associated with semantic 
indeterminacy by saying that it is associated with second-level indeterminacy. If one 
likes, one can also say that it is also associated with first-level indeterminacy, but there 
is no longer the same theoretical need to say this. One has accounted for the 
connection to indeterminacy already by appeal to the tie to second-level 
indeterminacy.14 Of course, it is intuitively repugnant also to think that vagueness 
gives rise to there being a tripartite distinction between what is true under all 
acceptable assignments, what is true under some but not all acceptable assignments, 
and what is true under no acceptable assignments. But this intuitive repugnancy, 
although real, is not very pressing: for there is no reason to think our competence with 
vague expressions should be a reliable source regarding the structure of what 
acceptable assignments there are. 
 Returning to the question of indeterminacy and the problem of unwanted 
boundaries, here is the relevant point. Unwanted boundaries are in some way a flaw in 
a given assignment, since an assignment purports to be a correct representation of the 
semantic values of the expressions of the language, and the counterintuitiveness is a 
strike against it succeeding in this. But incoherentism says that we are stuck with 
unwanted boundaries. Any assignment will be flawed in the sense of not fully 
respecting the meaning-constitutive principles for vague expressions. 
                                                           
13 This is not to say that incoherentism is the only view on vagueness that could have this 
consequence. 
14 In the literature, there are also general concerns about what semantic indeterminacy is 
supposed to be – see Merricks (2001) and Taylor and Burgess (2015). The suggestion mentioned 
does not immediately help with those concerns. 
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 I say that vagueness is associated with second-level indeterminacy, but I would 
not want to commit to the claim that every vague expression has to be associated with 
such indeterminacy. Suppose for example that reference magnetism is real: that some 
things expressions might mean are intrinsically more eligible to be meant (more 
‘reference-magnetic’).15 Then it can be that for some vague expressions there is a 
unique best assignment of a semantic value: that is the reference-magnetic semantic 
value in the vicinity, so to speak. Among what otherwise would have been a multitude 
of acceptable assignments, there is one that has the expression stand for something 
reference-magnetic. I would say that in this case, the expression is vague but not 
semantically indeterminate. That seems to me to be the right result. But I wouldn’t 
rest any argumentative weight on it, but regard these cases as spoils to the victor. 
Alternatively, one could distinguish two different kinds of vagueness, vagueness with 
respect to sense and vagueness with respect to reference, and say that an expression 
has the latter feature only if it has different semantic values under different 
assignments.16 
 
4. Objections regarding competence 
Turning to objections to the incoherentist view proposed, let me start by, in this section, 
considering the most obvious one: while incoherentism might be nice if it works, it 
requires an implausible view on meaning and competence. The underlying view is what 
I will call an SCR-view, where the SCR stands for selective conceptual role. It is a 
conceptual role view, for it associates an expression with a particular role in a speaker’s 
cognitive economy – that characterized by the dispositions vis-à-vis the meaning-
constitutive-principles – and says competence with an expression involves associating it 
with the right role. It is selective, for as opposed to holistic views, it says that only some 
                                                           
15 The label reference magnetism is from Hodes (1984). The idea as it has come to be discussed 
derives from Lewis (1983, 1984), although there is a discussion in the literature regarding what 
exactly Lewis’ views on this were – see e.g. Schwarz (2014). 
16 There is a connection between the themes brought up in the present section and 
epistemicism. If “epistemicism” is understood simply as the view that vagueness is compatible 
with both bivalence and classical logic, then the above suggests a defense of epistemicism 
different from those prominent in recent discussions. The idea is that each acceptable assignment 
is fully bivalent (at least as far as vagueness is concerned) and the only way the indeterminacy comes 
in, is through there being different acceptable assignments. Since bivalence holds under each 
acceptable assignment, bivalence holds simpliciter. Already Campbell (1974), an early defense of 
some sort of epistemicism, brought up a version of this idea, under the label “semantic 
uncertainty”. (The label “uncertainty” is not ideal: it suggests that the phenomenon is merely 
epistemic.) Compare too Nick Smith (2008) on ‘plurivaluationism’. Smith essentially defends a 
fuzzy view on vagueness but with the twist that he adds that there is (what I call) second-level 
indeterminacy: different assignments ascribing different (fuzzy) truth-values to sentences are 
all acceptable. 
 One main argument for epistemicism is to the effect that there is no avoiding 
unacceptable sharp boundaries anyway. But despite the undeniable strength of those arguments, 
it is hard to swallow the consequence that something about our use of expressions determine a 
unique best assignment of semantic values. The current proposal accepts those epistemicist 
arguments while avoiding this consequence. 
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of the representations involving the expression that one accepts or is disposed to accept 
are constitutive of what meaning one uses the expression with. 
There are two different perspectives from which one can attack the underlying 
view on meaning and competence. One can accept an SCR-view on competence but hold 
that for general reasons what competence disposes one to accept can never be 
incoherent in the way that incoherentism postulates, or one can reject an SCR-view in 
favor of something different entirely, for example the view that to be competent with an 
expression just amounts to having some capacities or other in virtue of which one uses 
it with the customary reference. Let me start by considering the view that although an 
SCR-view is acceptable, languages cannot be inconsistent in the way discussed. 
A problem for an SCR-view that aims to leave room for meanings to be 
inconsistent is that anyone who realizes that some set of principles lead to inconsistency 
– for example a philosopher studying the sorites paradox – will plausibly thereby be 
disinclined to accept all of these principles. And we don’t want to say that this 
philosopher thereby loses her semantic competence.  
However, this problem arises for any SCR-view given when the cognitive 
relation between a competent thinker and the meaning-constitutive principles is 
something like belief. But already independent considerations show that such an 
identification is too simple-minded. If anything has the status of a meaning-constitutive 
principle, the sentences expressing basic logical laws surely do. But for pretty much any 
basic logical law, one can find logicians and philosophers rejecting the sentences 
expressing them; and since these logicians and philosophers are (the argument goes) 
unquestionably competent, these sentences cannot be meaning-constitutive.17 Hence, 
the argument runs, it is somewhat trickier than might have been expected to identify 
the cognitive relation in question. But then simple-minded suggestions regarding the 
nature of the cognitive relation anyway do not work. 
 What might the cognitive relation plausibly be? Any discussion here will have to 
be brief. But one suggestion is that it is something like taking it to be the default 
position that [...]. (Implicitly, of course. The claim is not that speakers actually think if 
the expressions they use in these terms.) Strikingly, counterexamples to taking the 
cognitive relation to be something like (dispositions to) belief or acceptance always 
involve someone having a special reason to deny the supposed analyticity. Timothy 
Williamson has prominently called attention to Vann McGee’s rejection of modus 
ponens when criticizing the notion of epistemic analyticity, and he has also called 
attention to how speakers can for specific reasons reject instances of the schema ‘every 
F is an F’. But strikingly, the examples involve thinkers armed with specific reasons to 
reject the epistemic analyticities. If one imagines someone rejecting modus ponens or 
                                                           
17 See Williamson, e.g. (2007), for discussion. 
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instances of ‘every F is an F’ without special reason to do so, it becomes considerably 
more doubtful that this thinker – social externalism18 aside – uses these terms with 
their standard meanings.19 Another suggestion is to turn to normative characterizations, 
and speak of what speakers are entitled to accept instead of what they actually believe 
or are disposed to believe.20  
 If the meaning-inconsistency view couldn’t be combined with a plausible view 
on reference-determination – if, say, the meaning-inconsistency view had the 
consequence that the semantic values of vague expressions are undefined or empty – 
then there could be reason for a friend of an SCR-view to reject the possibility of a 
meaning-inconsistency view at least for philosophically significant cases. But I argued 
above that the Lewisian picture of reference-determination straightforwardly allows 
that vague predicates have non-empty extensions, even if inconsistent in the way 
outlined. 
Next, turn to Wright’s important (1975) discussion of incoherentism about 
vagueness. (Wright’s immediate target was Dummett (1975), which I will get to later.) 
Wright thinks meaning-consitutive principles cannot be inconsistent. One central point 
he makes is that meaning-constitutive rules cannot be inconsistent while sufficing, by 
themselves, to confer meaning upon an expression: since any use of the expression can 
be made to fit with the meaning-constitutive rules, these rules do not rule out 
anything.21  He says for instance that ‘[t]he rules of [a game supposed to be governed by 
inconsistent rules] do not provide an account of how the game is played, for it is 
possible that someone might grasp them yet be unable to participate’.22  
However, distinguish between the claim that a full account of an expression’s 
meaning (or of how a game is played) can be provided by a mere list of inconsistent 
rules (or as I would prefer to put it when speaking in my own voice, meaning-
constitutive principles), and the claim that some rules governing an expression are 
individually or jointly inconsistent. What Wright casts doubt on is the former claim, but 
incoherentism is only committed to the latter. Surely the view that meaning-
constitutive principles can be inconsistent does not carry with it a commitment to the 
view that our competence can be exhaustively described by appeal to a mere list of 
these inconsistent rules: matters like how the rules are to be weighted are also relevant. 
Some theorists want nothing to do with SCR-views, the possibility of 
                                                           
18 Social externalism is, roughly, the view that what an expression means as used by a speaker 
can be determined in part by the speaker’s social environment.  
19 See Williamson (2007), and, for discussion, Eklund (2007) and (2010a). Williamson uses 
these examples to criticize SCR-views; what I hold is that the examples only puts pressure on 
how SCR-views are best construed. Wright (2004), p. 169f, gestures toward the sort of idea I am 
describing here. 
20 See Scharp (2013), ch. 2. 
21 See Wright (1975), pp. 361ff. 
22 Wright (1975), p. 362. 
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incoherentism aside. Let me turn to this. Prominent among such theorists are those 
who hold that all there is to the semantics of an expression is its reference, plus aspects 
that do not directly relate to truth-conditions, such as conventional implicature - they 
eschew the notion of meaning-constitutive principles entirely. Call these theorists 
referentialists.23 It would obviously take us too far afield to assess fully generally 
whether a referentialist view or an SCR-view is preferable. But some things specifically 
pertaining to the case of vagueness are worth bringing up. 
One thing I would press against a referentialist is that she will have a hard time 
accommodating vagueness as genuinely a feature of the meaning of an expression. If the 
meaning of an expression just consists in its reference, then the only way an expression 
can be vague is if its referent is vague, or maybe if, along the lines of supervaluationism, 
it has different candidate referents – but these resources are too meager to capture 
vagueness, for there can be non-vague expressions that behave referentially in the same 
way that vague expressions do. Suppose for example that a simple fuzzy theory is the 
correct theory of vagueness, and suppose that someone is tall* to degree 1 iff that 
person is at least 1900 mm, tall* to degree 0 iff that person is 1800 mm or less, and tall* 
to degree d if in between, where d= (the person’s height in mm – 1800) / 100. ‘Tall*’ is 
hardly vague, despite having a fuzzy semantics. There is no reason why it would invite a 
sorites paradox; the principle that a tiny difference in height makes no difference to 
tall*ness lacks plausibility. Or compare a simple version of supervaluationism, where 
what marks an expression as vague simply is its having different possible 
precisifications. Compare then a predicate ‘nice’, stipulated to behave as follows: a 
number is nice if <13; not nice if >15.24 One might add that for any n, if n is nice then n-
1 is likewise nice. ‘Nice’ then has different precisifications, since nothing has been said 
about the classification of 13, 14 and 15. ‘Nice’ behaves referentially like vague 
predicates behave according to this simple version of supervaluationism, but it is not 
vague. Now, a simple fuzzy theory and simple supervaluationism are, precisely, simple 
theories. For all I have actually argued, more sophisticated theories could succeed in 
characterizing vagueness referentially. That would have to be judged on a case by case 
basis. But I believe the strategy illustrated by these simple cases generalizes. 
Importantly, the argument is not to the effect that what the theories say about the 
referential properties of vague expressions is mistaken but only that it does not suffice 
to characterize vagueness. 
Some theorists believe in metaphysical vagueness. They may think that vague 
singular terms refer to vague entities, and vague predicates ascribe vague properties; 
and that the vagueness of the expressions is due to the vagueness in the entities that 
they refer to and ascribe. If these theorists are right, then of course something about the 
                                                           
23 The label is from Williamson (2009). 
24 Compare Fine (1975), p. 266. 
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reference of vague expressions separates them from non-vague expressions: all and only 
vague expressions refer to vague entities. The referentialist can say that this 
distinguishes the reference of vague expressions from the reference of other 
expressions.  
Elsewhere, I have given separate arguments against metaphysical vagueness.25 
But there is a point to be made even if metaphysical vagueness does obtain. Let the 
truth value-contribution of an expression be the complete set of facts regarding what it 
contributes to the truth-values of sentences in which it is used. Using this notion, the 
point of my above argument is that the truth value-contribution of a vague expression 
can be the same as the truth value-contribution of a non-vague expression, and this 
point stands even given supposing there is metaphysical vagueness. And this by itself 
means that theorizing about the reference of vague expressions is unlikely to hold the 
key to the puzzles surrounding vagueness.  
What I have been talking about is just an instance of a more general problem for 
the referentialist way of thinking about meaning. Consider normative language. Some 
expressions (‘right’, ‘wrong’, etc.) seem to be normative as a matter of their meanings. A 
referentialist would have to say that any such expression would have to classify as such 
in virtue of what it refers to. But this is problematic: normative and non-normative 
expressions can corefer. A quick argument to that effect is that one could easily 
introduce a non-normative expression with the same reference as a normative 
expression (consider for example ‘let “flurg” refer to whatever the third word uttered by 
someone over six feet tall in the year 2073 refers to’, and suppose that third word is 
‘right’).26  
One suggestion for a would-be referentialist who happily lives with the 
consequence that vagueness and evaluativeness cannot be semantic features is that she 
might take these features to be metasemantic rather than semantic: these are not 
features of the meaning of an expression but have to do with how the reference of the 
expression is determined. In the case of vagueness, she can say that the vagueness of an 
expression has to do with how its reference is determined. She can then defend a 
slimmed down version of what the incoherentist holds: the language users’ acceptance 
of tolerance principles help determine the reference of vague expressions. 
 
5. Further objections 
I have discussed at some length objections to incoherentism that focus on the 
underlying conception of meaning and competence. Let me now turn to some other 
objections. 
Charity. One possible objection is that even if inconsistent languages like those 
                                                           
25 See Eklund (2013). 
26 I discuss this in ch. 4 of Eklund (forthcoming). 
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described are possible, charity militates against the hypothesis that we speak such an 
inconsistent language. Even though it is a theoretical possibility that we speak such a 
language, other interpretive possibilities are vastly preferable. But there’s a question of 
how charity is supposed to come into it. Charity would enter into it most obviously if 
the incoherentist view but not opposing views ascribed incoherent beliefs to us. But 
such a claim would be doubly mistaken. First, and most importantly, on any reasonable 
view, we are prone to incoherent beliefs when it comes to vagueness. That is why the 
sorites paradox arises. Second, a plausible version of incoherentism speaks not of what 
competence demands that we believe but instead of, for example, what competence 
disposes us to accept. This means that appeal to charity has even less purchase. 
 Note too that in principle it can be overall more reasonable for a thinker to 
employ quick but dirty rules – rules that are easy to employ but which may lead the 
thinker astray in some special cases – than for her to employ corresponding 
considerably more complex rules guaranteed never to lead her astray but considerably 
less economical to employ.27 All else equal, an interpreter deciding which of these sets 
of rules to interpret a thinker as employing may well be led by some charity-like 
principle positively to prefer interpret the thinker as employing the quick but dirty 
rules. 
 The consideration just presented works best if one understands ‘rules’ in the 
context as an algorithm the thinker’s cognitive system employs. This goes beyond how 
‘rules’ has been glossed earlier in the discussion and one must hence be careful. There 
still is a general lesson in the vicinity. 
Tolerance without incoherence. The last few years have seen an increase in 
interest in accepting tolerance principles at face value but making such revisions in 
logic – specifically in what structural rules are accepted – that this does not lead to 
absurdity.28 This is one way in which the theoretical landscape has changed since when 
I first defended the incoherentist view here outlined. Any theorist who can accept 
tolerance principles at face value can adopt the account of the nature of vagueness that I 
presented. So the existence of views like that described shows that the argument 
concerning the nature of vagueness and the argument from flip-flopping do not favor 
incoherentism over all possible competitors, even if these arguments are otherwise good 
as far as they go. I still think incoherentism is to be preferred over these non-
incoherentist tolerance views. For one thing, I think incoherentism is uniquely well 
placed to capture the sense that there can be no fully adequate account of the truth-
conditions of vague sentences; and, relatedly, explain the phenomenon of recalcitrance. 
Of course, to make this point against those who favor non-incoherentist theories that 
respect tolerance it would have to be shown that these theories are indeed 
                                                           
27 See e.g. Cherniak (1984). 
28 See e.g. Zardini (2008). 
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unsatisfactorily counterintuitive. I will not attempt to do this here. 
 One way in which the rejection of structural rules differs from other proposed 
revisions of logic is in that whereas one can see logics that differ over the semantics of 
individual logical expressions as corresponding to different languages, structural rules 
are not tied to language in the same way. The reason this is relevant is the following. So 
long as we are dealing with descriptions of different possible languages one can say that 
the question of which possible language we speak is to be decided by a theory of 
interpretation. But if structural rules are not tied to language in the same way, things 
may look different.  However, although structural rules may not strictly be part of 
language it can still obviously be that different thinkers, or different groups of thinkers, 
employ different structural rules. A theory of interpretation for a thinker or group of 
thinkers will then concern not only what language is employed by also such matters as 
what rules of reasoning are employed; and when it comes to the question of which 
interpretation is correct, it is a package deal. 
Vagueness without tolerance. Much of the supposed attraction of the view 
stems from its supposed ability to satisfactorily answer the question of what the nature 
of vagueness is. In other words, it is due to the attraction of saying that tolerance 
principles are meaning-constitutive for vague expressions. But not all vague expressions 
are plausibly governed by tolerance principles. First, tolerance principles are 
formulated for predicates, but there are arguably vague expressions of other categories 
(consider, for example, vague quantifiers). Second, even focusing on the specific case 
of predicates, what about a predicate like ‘has few children for an academic’? This 
seems to be a vague predicate, but because the associated sorites series would be so 
short, there is no associated compelling version of the sorites paradox.29  
Complexity. By far the most serious objection to incoherentism, as far as I am 
concerned, is this. Vagueness would seem to be a ubiquitous feature of languages. But if 
the proposed incoherentist view on vagueness were correct, that would hardly be so. For 
why would it be a ubiquitous feature of languages to have meaning-constitutive 
principles of this rather peculiar kind for a large range of predicates? Other theories 
more readily account for the ubiquity of vagueness. On a theory on which vagueness is 
at bottom metaphysical, a language is vague simply because it contains expressions 
referring to the vague things in the world. On a supervaluationist theory, vagueness 
arises simply because of semantic indecision. Call this objection to incoherentism the 
objection from complexity. 
One incoherentist response to this objection is to just insist upon the arguments 
in favor of the view, and say that these arguments yield that we must accept the view: 
maybe it is antecedently unikely that what the incoherentist postulates is a ubiquitous 
                                                           




feature of languages, but somehow or other it must be so. This response can be 
bolstered by closer consideration of the supposedly simpler theories that would avoid 
the objection from complexity.  
An incoherentist can try to present the supervaluationist with a dilemma. A very 
simple form of supervaluationism will say that an expression’s vagueness consists in the 
expression having multiple precisifications. This feature is likely to be ubiquitous. There 
will be vagueness thus conceived in all natural languages. But this simple 
supervaluationism will not do. Any partially defined expression will be classified as 
vague.  If in response to this the supervaluationist complicates her theory, she will face 
the same sophistication problem as incoherentism does. Why think this complex 
phenomenon would be thus ubiquitous? The supervaluationist then faces a version of 
the problem of complexity. 
A similar issue arises when it comes to metaphysical vagueness. On a simple 
view on metaphysical vagueness, vagueness is plausibly ubiquitous but the simple view 
is too simple to be satisfactory; given a more complex view the ubiquity is again hard to 
explain. An example of a simple view would be one where metaphysical vagueness 
simply gives rise to there being some sentences lacking classical truth-values. A more 
sophisticated view tries to get around the obvious problems faced by this simple 
account by adding complexity, but then a version of the problem of complexity arises. 
 
5. Related views 
In this last section let me consider some views in the literature similar to mine – those 
of Terence Horgan (1994), Peter Unger (1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980) and Michael 
Dummett (1975). Horgan and Dummett are plausibly classified as incoherentists, and 
Unger’s view is similar in spirit.30 
Horgan (1994) presents a kind of thesis-antithesis-synthesis argument where 
the thesis is that vagueness is impossible (because of leading to contradiction), the 
antithesis is that vagueness is possible (because clearly actual) – and the synthesis is 
 
Vagueness in THE WORLD is impossible; vagueness in thought and in language is 
incoherent and yet is actual (and hence possible) anyway.31 
 
The world itself cannot be vague, but our representations of it can be. It is only that 
vague language and thought is incoherent. This is of course completely consonant with 
the incoherentist view that I have stated. 
Horgan is rather cavalier about the nature of the supposed incoherence in 
                                                           
30 As discussed in fn3, Unger’s view is not strictly an incoherentist view. It is, however, similar 
enough that comparing Unger’s view is useful. 
31 Horgan (1994), p. 179. 
 
18 
thought and language. He says ‘For purposes of this paper I can leave it open how best 
to cash the general notion of logical incoherence…. Roughly, a concept is logically 
incoherent if someone who employs it correctly thereby becomes committed, at least 
implicitly, to accepting statements that jointly entail a contradiction’.32  He does not 
directly address the question of how the supposed incoherence affects the truth-
conditions of vague sentences, but instead spends some time arguing that the 
incoherence is insulated in such a way that it does not ‘propagat[e] itself destructively 
through our thought and discourse’.33 That point is actually rather obvious, 
independently of the specifics of incoherentism: for somehow or other we can have 
inconsistent beliefs without that having seriously damaging consequences. It is not 
clear why having inconsistent meaning-constitutive beliefs (or dispositions thereto) 
would need to be any different in that regard. 
Peter Unger (e.g. 1979a) holds that when F is a ‘vague discriminative term’ the 
following holds: 
 
There is some relevant dimension of difference D such that (i) if something differs 
from an F minutely along D, then it also is an F, and (ii) if something is an F, then 
there is some actual or possible differing substantially along D which is not an F.34 
 
This yields via familiar sorites reasoning that there are no Fs. The assumption that 
something is F leads to contradiction.35 
Unger’s reasoning leads to many radical conclusions. There are no heaps, no 
clouds, no persons, no one knows anything, etc. To my mind, Unger simply overlooks 
the sort of possibility that I explore in what I say about reference-determination. Even if 
Unger is completely right about what principles in some sense govern vague predicates, 
the semantic values of vague expressions can fail to render them true. 
It is in principle possible, of course, to attend to the possibility I call attention to 
and still conclude with Unger that vague expressions are empty. One can have a theory 
of how meaning-constitutive principles constrain or determine semantic values that 
yields that incoherence always carries emptiness in its wake. Or one can, in principle, 
allow that expressions governed by incoherent meaning-constitutive principles are non-
empty but hold that features specific to the case of vagueness make it the case that 
vague expressions are empty: for example, one could hold that tolerance is so central to 
the use of vague predicates that no assignment of semantic values that fails to respect 
                                                           
32 Horgan (1994), p. 180. 
33 Horgan (1994), p. 180. 
34 Unger (1979a). The exact formulation in the text is my own. Unger’s own statements are found 
on p. 181 (rough version) and p. 182 (more careful general version).  
35 Other relatively recent theorists who have held that vagueness implies emptiness or lack of 




tolerance comes ‘close enough’. But let me here again stress what was said earlier about 
assertibility. If one holds that vague expressions have no, or only trivial, semantic 
values, then one will want to draw a distinction between vague sentences that are 
properly assertible and those that are not. But if one succeeds in drawing such a 
distinction, can not the theory of assertibility one then can construct function equally 
well as an account of truth-conditions? 
In his (1975), Michael Dummett says that the use of vague expressions is 
‘intrinsically inconsistent’ and that there can be no ‘coherent logic’ of vague expressions. 
This is in an otherwise very careful and clear article, but Dummett does not elaborate 
much. And the slogans Dummett uses are not very clear. One can easily come up with 
uncharitable ways of reading Dummett. Start with the talk of ‘no coherent logic’. What 
does this mean? That there is a logic of vague expressions, but it is incoherent? If so, 
what does this mean? A certain kind of theorist could propose that a paraconsistent 
logic is appropriate for a vague language, but that can hardly be what Dummett has in 
mind. Or that there is no logic of vague expressions? But what does that mean, in light 
of the fact that some arguments involving vague expressions are clearly valid and some 
are clearly non-valid. As for ‘intrinsically inconsistent’, what does this mean? Can I not 
use a vague expression, and with its customary meaning, but apply it only to some 
paradigm positive cases, disapply it only to some paradigm negative cases, and 
maintain a studious silence when it comes to everything in between? If so, the use I 
make of the expression is recognizably consistent. 
 This is not to say that one cannot interpret Dummett more charitably. The talk 
of the use of vague expressions being intrinsically inconsistent can be interpreted to 
mean that someone using a vague expression with its customary meaning takes on 
incoherent obligations or has incoherent dispositions. The talk of there being no 
coherent logic of vagueness can be interpreted to mean that there can be no logic of 
vagueness that respects the meaning-constitutive principles of all the expressions of our 
language. In other words, Dummett can be interpreted in such a way that what he says 
is fully consonant with what I want to say. 
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